Van Inwagen on Free Will
Peter van Inwagen I can remember very clearly the first time van Inwagen encountered the problem of free will. In the autumn of 1965 he was talking with a fellow graduate student at the University of Rochester, one Myles Brand, and made some remark that presupposed the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Brand told him-second-year graduate student to first-year graduate student-that most philosophers believed that free will and determinism were compatible, and outlined some of the currently popular arguments for that position. As Athena from the head of Zeus, the argument that van Inwagen was to publish ten years later in "The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism" (1975) sprang from his head pretty much full-grownalthough it made its entrance into the world by way of his ever-active mouth and not by Athena's rather more unorthodox route.
The argument had it roots in the following reflections. If free will and determinism coexist, then someone is able to do something not contained in that one possible future that is consistent both with the past and the laws of nature. Suppose that Alice, an inhabitant of a deterministic world, is able to do something she is not in fact going to do; suppose, to be specific, that although she is going to remain a prisoner, she is able to escape from her prison. Her ability to escape can be looked upon as an ability to divert the river of coming events into a channel through which it is not in fact going to flow; to realize, that is, or to cause to be actual, a possible future that is not the future that lies before her, to cause to be actual one of those possible futures in which she escapes. And what would these possible but nonactual futures be like? Let's say that the past of a possible but nonactual future is that possible past that would be the actual past if that future were the actual future. Any given future in which Alice escapes must either be a future whose past is the actual past and which is discontinuous with that past, or a future that is continuous with its past but whose past is not the actual past (a past different from the actual past all the way back to the Big Bang), or, finally, a future in which the world is governed by laws of nature that are not the actual laws. But Alice can bring about futures of none of these sorts. If it is insufficiently evident as it stands that she can bring about none of these futures, here is an argument. Let 'Clio' be a proper name for the actual pastthus, when I imagine, as I am about to, Alice using the name 'Clio' in another possible world, I imagine her referring to the past as it is in our world, not the past as it is in hers. Similarly, let 'Nomos' be a proper name for the actual laws of nature (which, remember, we are assuming to be deterministic).
It would seem that if Alice is able to escape, she must be able in some sense to cause the actuality of or bring about or realize a future in which she could say, and in so saying speak truly, one of the following three things:
There has been a causal break; the present state of affairs is not continuous with the past.
The present is continuous with the past, but that past is not Clio; it is some other past (a past different from Clio all the way back to the Big Bang).
The laws of nature are not Nomos, but some other set of laws.
And, obviously, Alice is not able to get herself into a future in which she can say any of these things and be right.
When van Inwagen got around to writing down the argument that had occurred to him in his conversation with Brand-he first did this in a doctoral thesis he wrote under the supervision of Richard Taylor (de jure) and Keith Lehrer (de facto)-the argument he wrote down did not look much like the argument I have just set out. (It looked very much like the argument he would later publish in "The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.") Nevertheless, the central idea of both arguments was the same, and they no doubt stand or fall together.
When van Inwagen had got his first academic job and was trying to publish this argument, he found it extraordinarily hard to do so. The reason was simple: the conclusion of the argument was known to be false. The unanimous position of the referees whose reports were enclosed with the rejection letters could have been expressed in the following words, which I take from an essay by Donald Davidson, words as well known as they are ungrammatical: I shall not be directly concerned with such arguments [i.e., arguments for the incompatiblity of free will and determinism], since I know of none that is more than superficially Montague's "Deterministic Theories"(1974) ; the impetus for its writing was a suggestion of Rolf Eberle's.)
Van Inwagen summed up his thought on free will in his book An Essay on
Free , and has pretty much avoided learning anything about the problem since-other than by sitting about and thinking it over. (The publication of this book by Oxford University Press was due to the good offices of Tony Kenny and Derek Parfit, neither of whom could have had any sympathy whatever with its content, and van Inwagen has always been grateful to them for their generosity and has tried to imitate it. He has done his best to learn from them the hard lesson that a philosophical book that he regards as thoroughly wrongheaded can nevertheless be a good book.)
Van Inwagen likes to think that this book bears a significant share of the responsibility for the fact that incompatibilists are now much more common than they were thirty or forty years ago. In a paper that he read at a conference in the early nineties, van Inwagen made a remark to the effect that compatibilism was the standard view among philosophers. Michael Slote, who was in the audience, said that he thought that, on the contrary, incompatibilism had become the standard view, or at least the majority view. are clearly the stronger-at best only a small proportion of the occasions on which we make a choice are occasions on which we make a free choice.
('At best' because there may be no free will at all; perhaps determinism is true, or perhaps-as Broad believed-free action is incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism and is therefore a self-contradictory idea.)
Van Inwagen concluded that no action is free unless it is the outcome of deliberation in which one considers reasons that support that act, reasons that support various alternative acts, and in the course of which one finds no obvious answer to the question, 'Which set of reasons should prevail?'
To take one example among many different sorts of possible example of the consequences of this position, if you answer the telephone 'automatically', if you answer the telephone without so much as considering the question whether you should answer it, your act is not a free act: you could not have done otherwise than answer the telephone; you were not able to let it ring till it fell silent; it was not within your power not to raise the receiver.
After presenting arguments for this thesis, van Inwagen went on to attempt to show that it does not, or does not obviously, have a certain untoward consequence that it might be thought to have. He contended that from the premise that at best a very small proportion of our acts are free acts, the conclusion does not follow that only a very small proportion of our ascriptions of moral responsibility are correct. For, he maintained, although there is an inseverable connection between free will and moral responsibility, this connection, inseverable though it be, can be stretched exceedingly fine. An example will illustrate his point. Suppose a man is driving drunk and that a pedestrian suddenly looms before him. He attempts to swerve, but too late:
he hits and kills the pedestrian because his reflexes are impaired by alcohol.
Compare his case with the case of a sober, able, and alert driver whose car strikes and kills a pedestrian in circumstances in which swerving in time to avoid the pedestrian would have required a reaction time smaller than that allowed by the speed of propagation of human neural impulses. In neither case was the driver able to avoid hitting the pedestrian who suddenly loomed before him, but when we consider the former case, we hold the driver morally responsible for the pedestrian's death, and when we consider the latter case we do not.
The relevant difference is, of course, that the man whose reflexes were impaired by drink, was, so to speak, able to avoid being unable to avoid hitting the pedestrian, and the sober and alert driver was unable to avoid being unable to avoid hitting the pedestrian. At the moment he first saw the pedestrian, the drunk driver was unable to avoid hitting him, but he had earlier been able, or so we should suppose if we were judge or jury, to avoid driving with the impaired reflexes that were the cause of his fatal inability at the time of the accident. Van Inwagen suggested that this sort of case could serve as a model for the relation between ability and responsibility.
Here is a second case, a case in which the inseverable connection between ability and responsibility, though it remains unsevered, as inseverable connections do, is stretched considerably further than it is in most philosophical examples concerning moral responsibility and the ability to do otherwise. Consider a man who is, in middle age, a corrupt politician and is, owing to his corrupted nature, unable to refuse bribes when he believes there is no significant likelihood of the bribery coming to light. That is how he is, but how did he get that way? Suppose the answer is this: as a young man, he made a certain series of free choices, choices preceded by genuine deliberation, which collectively had the effect of establishing him in settled and unbreakable habits of venality. Van Inwagen argued-guided, I
suppose, by Aristotle-that this politician can properly be held morally responsible for the baleful effects on the public welfare of the informal services he renders to his political cronies in return for money. And this despite the fact that he is unable, in middle age, to reject the bribes he is offered. He can properly be held responsible for, say, the deaths of the four children in the fire in the building that wasn't up to code, because he could, as a young man, have avoided becoming the sort of man who would be unable to resist the bribe offered by the slumlord who owned the building.
Several philosophers have disputed van Inwagen's conclusion that the principles that lead philosophers to incompatibilism entail that free acts, if they exist at all, are extremely rare, but van Inwagen has never been able to see any force in their arguments. Although he has published answers to them (1994), he is of the opinion that no answers were needed; that his original arguments were untouched by the arguments of his critics. One philosopher, who generally disagrees with van Inwagen about free will, find the thesis that we lack free will much less unappealing if this thesis could be shown not to entail that we can never be held to moral account for anything.
I have said that Frankfurt's argument has been taken by some to show that it is possible for one to be morally responsible for something even though one has never been able to do otherwise. The actual conclusion of I have used the qualified phrases 'has a great deal of force' and 'has never been shown conclusively to be mistaken' because, although van Van Inwagen has never seen any need to rethink the position he took concerning this principle when he first formulated it in the late seventies (with this minor qualification: as I have said, he has come to prefer a revised version of the principle), to wit that it is extremely plausible that it entails that moral responsibility requires free will, and that it cannot be re- proposed a conditional-analysis argument for the compatibility of free will and indeterminism; this argument was, admittedly, a rather absurd argument; his point was that the unbiased inquirer should see that the conditional analysis argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism was equally absurd, and absurd for an exactly parallel reason.) Van Inwagen has thought little about free will in the last ten years, but he has thought enough about the topic to have changed his mind on one point and to have become increasingly insistent on another.
The point on which he has changed his mind is this: he now thinks that Rule ␤, as he presented it in An Essay on Free Will and other places, is wrong.
This rule of inference was stated as follows:
p, and no one has, or ever had, any choice about that. If p then q, and no one has, or ever had, any choice about that. Hence, q, and no one has, or ever had, any choice about that.
Van Inwagen had thought that this rule was obviously valid, had made use of it in formulating one version of his argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism (his favorite version, the version inspired by Carl Ginet's "Might We Have No Choice?" [1966] ), had said that, despite its seeming obviousness, it was nevertheless the weakest link in the chain of reasoning that led from the assumption of determinism to the conclusion that no one is ever able to do otherwise. And, although this principle is used in only one of the three formal versions of the argument he has presented, van Inwagen is on record as saying that, in his opinion, if Rule ␤ should turn out to be invalid, it would almost certainly be the case that the two versions of the argument that do not involve the concept 'having a choice' would also turn out to be invalid. inal Rule ␤ turned out to be an illusion-since the rule has in fact turned out to be invalid-how much confidence should we have in the revised versions? Nemesis, in the form of a counterexample, was all along lying in wait for Rule ␤; why should we not take very seriously the epistemic possibility that in some dark corner of logical space, cousins of this Nemesis patiently await their appointments with the revised rules?" This pointed question is pointed indeed. Van Inwagen admits that he has no good answer to this question, and that, in consequence, although he accepts the revised rule, he assigns its validity a rather lower subjective probability than the near certainty he once so confidently assigned to the validity of the original ␤. He does, however, withdraw his assent to a thesis I mentioned a moment ago, the thesis that if Rule ␤ should turn out to be invalid, this would mean that there was almost certainly something wrong with the other arguments he has given for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. He withdraws his assent because the counterexamples that have shown the invalidity of Rule ␤, the McKay-Johnson counterexamples, depend on some unexpected properties of an English phrase-"has a choice about"-that played a key role in his formulation of the original principle. He is inclined to think that the 'general idea' behind Rule ␤ was sound, and that its invalidity stemmed from the fact that certain features of the English phrase unfit it for the task he assigned to it. When he made the statement from which he has now withdrawn his assent, he was assuming that if Rule ␤ were shown to be invalid, this would be because someone had shown that the general idea behind the principle was fundamentally defective. But the revised versions of the rule appeal to this same general idea; they are merely (it is hoped) adequate implementations of this idea, implementations from which a technical defect has been removed.
I have said that in recent times, van Inwagen has changed his mind about one point and has become increasingly insistent on another. I have discussed the point on which he has changed his mind. The point on which he has become increasing insistent is this: free will is a mystery, a groundfloor, first-water, Colin McGinn-style philosophical mystery. Free will is a mystery because, although it obviously exists-of course we sometimes confront a choice between A and B and are, while we are trying to decide whether to do A or to do B, able to do A and able to do B-it seems to be incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, and thus seems to 224 P. van Inwagen be impossible. When he says that free will seems to be incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism, van Inwagen means that there are good arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism and good arguments for incompatibility of free will and indeterminism, and that no one has ever identified a very plausible candidate for the flaw in any of the arguments in either class. Van Inwagen, of course, believes that the arguments he has given for the incompatibility of free will and determinism contain no flaws-or, at the worst, contain minor, technical flaws that could be repaired without altering their essential points-and that there is Free will is incompatible with determinism Some people are morally responsible for various things, but no one has free will People are sometimes morally responsible for various things.
And the falsity of any of these propositions would be, in his view, an even greater mystery than the falsity of the proposition that free will is compatible with indeterminism. Second, there are lots of philosophical mysteries, most of which have nothing to do with free will. I might cite one or more of the great philosophical mysteries, such as 'temporal passage' or human consciousness. But I will mention instead two minor mysteries that are no less mysterious for being minor. I will mention two mysteries that carry much less emotional weight than the mystery of free will, or are, as one might say, unconnected with anything we care deeply about-unlike free will and time and consciousness, which are connected with many things that we care deeply about: the mystery of vagueness and the mystery of the Liar. It is obviously true that a currently living American male who is seven feet four inches tall is tall, and is tall without qualification (i.e., is not simply tall to degree 0.99972 or something like that). It is obviously true that the president-elect, falsely believing himself to have lost the election, might address an audience and say, bitterly and sincerely, "Everything the president-elect tells anyone today is false." I do not think that either of these obvious truths is free from apparent paradox-although, of course, no paradox can be more than apparent, for no truth can really imply a selfcontradictory statement or even a false statement. And yet there are very good arguments for the conclusion that each of these obvious truths entails various statements that are self-contradictory or at least obviously false.
And I cannot find any flaw in these arguments, though, of course, there must be flaws in them. Van Inwagen's expectation is that some premise (or more than one) in the several arguments for the incompatibility of free will and indeterminism is false but seems to us to be an obvious truth-as was once the case with the proposition that there are twice as many natural numbers as there are even numbers, the Galilean law of the addition of velocities, the argument that, since space is unbounded, it must be infinite, or the unrestricted comprehension principle in set theory. But if van
Inwagen is wrong about this, the following is certainly the case: some proposition (or maybe there is more than one) about matters relating to free will, determinism, and moral responsibility that seems to us to be obviously true is false. Perhaps we shall one day discover what proposition this is, or what propositions these are, and it, or they, will come to have no more appeal to philosophers than the proposition that there are twice as many natural numbers as there are even numbers (which Galileo thought evident, despite his awareness that the two classes of numbers could be put into one-one correspondence) has for us. Or perhaps, as Chomsky (1988, (151) (152) and McGinn (1993) have suggested, some evolutionarily contingent feature of the design of the human intellect renders it biologically impossible for us to think our way through the free will problem to a satisfactory conclusion. I will remark, because it makes a nice link with my next topic, that van Inwagen has strong, I might almost say fraternal, feelings for Chomsky when he considers Chomsky's position on free will and determinism. Chomsky thinks that free will must be compatible with determinism, and that, nevertheless, it is a mystery how this could be. Van
Inwagen thinks that free will must be compatible with indeterminism, and that, nevertheless, it is a mystery how this could be. Van Inwagen's feeling is that Chomsky, although he is mistaken about a particular point (an important point, to be sure), appreciates the depth and difficulty of the free will problem, while the majority of van Inwagen's fellow incompatibilists, although they are right on a particular point (and a very important point it is), do not really appreciate the depth and difficulty of the problem. would not have risen, and that she, Marie, a particular member of the metaphysical category 'substance' or 'continuant', was the cause-that is to say, the agent cause-of that crucial brain event. The friends of agent causation, if van Inwagen understands them, believe that these suppositions are sufficient for her having freely raised her hand. If that is so, these suppositions must entail the following proposition: at some moment shortly before
Marie raised her hand, she was able to raise her hand and she was able not to raise her hand. But van Inwagen doesn't see why this entailment should be supposed to hold. In fact, he thinks he sees a good argument for the conclusion that it was not up to her whether her hand rose. Suppose God were miraculously to return the world to precisely the state it was in, say, one minute before Marie raised her hand, and that he then allowed affairs once more to proceed, without any further miracles. What would happen?
What would Marie do? Well, if her raising her hand was a free act, and if free will is incompatible with determinism, then we can't say. We can say only that she might have raised her hand and might not have raised her hand. If
God were to cause this episode to be thus "replayed" a very large number of times, it might turn out that she raised her hand in thirty percent of the replays and refrained from raising it in seventy percent of the replays. This much is a simple consequence of incompatibilism, and it brings one of the main reasons philosophers become compatibilists into stark relief. It seems to lead us inescapably to the conclusion that on each particular replay, what
Marie does on that occasion is a mere matter of chance. And if there are no replays, if there is only one occasion on which Marie is in this situation, it seems to lead us just as inescapably to the conclusion that on that one occasion what Marie does is a mere matter of chance. And if it is a mere matter of chance whether Marie raised her hand, then it cannot have been true beforehand that Marie was both able to raise her hand and able to refrain from raising her hand, for to have both these abilities would be to be able to determine the outcome of a process whose outcome is due to chance. It is true that we have, by stipulation, inserted into this process, this process whose outcome is due to chance, an episode of agent causation. But, if I may so express myself, so what? That doesn't change the fact that the outcome of that process was due to chance. If God caused Marie's decision to be replayed a very large number of times, sometimes (in thirty percent of the replays, let us say) Marie would have agent-caused the crucial brain event and sometimes (in seventy percent of the replays, let us say) she would not have.
Surely, then, whether she agent-caused the brain event was a mere matter of chance? Whether her deliberations were followed by her agent-causing the brain event was, it would seem, a matter of chance; Marie, therefore, cannot have been both able to agent-cause the brain event and able to refrain from agent-causing the brain event, for to have both these abilities would be to be able to determine the outcome of a process whose outcome was due to chance-an impossible ability. I conclude that even if an episode of agent causation is among the causal antecedents of every voluntary human action, these episodes do nothing to undermine the prima facie impossibility of an undetermined free act. Postulating agent causation, therefore, does nothing to diminish the mystery of free will. Van Inwagen's conclusion is that incompatibilists had better abandon the concept of agent causation, and seek a resolution of the mystery of free will elsewhere-if, indeed, there is an 'elsewhere'.
Notes

